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1 Introduction 
 
Synaesthesia is a relatively rare condition that manifests itself in approximately four 
percent of the population. It is a phenomenon that occurs automatically and, 
JHQHUDOO\ZLWKFRQVLGHUDEOHFRQVLVWHQF\RYHUWLPH,WKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVDµXQLRQ
RIWKHVHQVHV¶&\WRZLF0DUNV0RWOuk, 1994; Vernon, 1930) and, 
typically, arises as result of stimulation in one sense (an inducer) triggering a reaction 
in an unstimulated second sense (a concurrent).  The most commonly examined form 
is grapheme-colour synaesthesia in which colours are experienced in response to 
digits or letters (Hubbard, 2007) although many other combinations exist: a sensation 
of colour may be elicited on hearing certain sounds, or in association with certain 
tastes, or by touch. Furthermore, although often described as a purely sensory to 
sensory phenomenon, it is also possible for inducers to be non-sensory in nature. For 
example, some common forms result in an experience of colours and spatial layouts 
in association with days of the week or calendar months; neither months, nor days of 
the week, can be described as delivering any sensory input, per se. This review 
provides a commentary in three parts on the existing literature that explores a form of 
synaesthesia also known as chromesthesia, or coloured hearing, that arises on hearing 
music.  The first part of the review begins by considering the characteristics of music-
colour synaesthesia and the commonalities between the synaesthetic experience and 
normal cross-modal perceptions in non-synaesthetes (Ward, Huckstep, & Tsakanikos, 
2006a; Isbilen & Krumhansl, 2016). The second part of the review discusses the two 
main neurological hypotheses pertaining to the cause of synaesthesia: the 
hyperconnectivity theory (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a) and the disinhibited 
feedback theory (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) followed by a discussion of the 
results of eight neuroimaging studies with a sound-colour focus. The final section 
explores how some types of music-colour synaesthesia provide further evidence in 
support of the importance of the role of conceptual and semantic inducers in 
synaesthesia, DQGWKHDOWHUQDWLYHWKHRU\RIµLGHDHVWKHVLD¶1LNROLü0URF]NR-
:ąVRZLF]	1LNROLü7KHUHYLHZFRQFOXGHVZLWKDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKH
challenge presented by synaesthesia to established philosophical theories and the 
position music-colour synaesthesia might occupy within the larger context of musical 
qualia. 
2 CHARACTERISTICS AND COMMONALITIES 
 
2.1  The Characteristics of Music-Colour Synaesthesia 
 
7KHXPEUHOODWHUPµPXVLF-colour V\QDHVWKHVLD¶RUVLPSO\µFRORXUHG-KHDULQJ¶KDVEHHQ
applied to the experience of colour elicited on hearing sounds. There are several 
different types of music-colour synaesthesia which manifest in quite different ways 
and might include not just the experience of colours, but also of textures, shapes and 
spatial landscapes (Eagleman & Goodale, 2009). Peacock (1985) broadly classified 
IRXUJURXSVRIµLQGXFHUV¶UHODWHGWRFRPSRVLWLRQDOVW\OHWLPEUHWRQDOLW\DQGSLWFKRU
tone).  These may be further differentiated to include relationships between colour per 
individual composer, colour and certain keys, and colour occurring from differing 
harmonic progressions (Vernon, 1930). It is not uncommon for synaesthetes to 
experience combinations of these different types, and the idiosyncratic nature of the 
condition frequently results in individual synaesthetes disagreeing about the colours 
and imagery associated with musical inducers: one synaesthete may consider B minor 
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to be the colour of sunlight on a window pane, yet for another B minor is sea green. 
Examples of the different types of music-colour synaesthesia experienced are given 
by GS, the subject of Mills, Boteler, and /DUFRPEH¶V (2003) study. Her experiences 
encompass shapes, texture, and movement, in addition to colours. GS reports big 
blocks of dark colours in response to heavy metal music, and displeasing 
combinations of colours to music that she does not like.  GS does not possess absolute 
pitch but found that higher pitches would be accompanied by lighter colours and 
lower pitches by darker colours. GS also explained that different instruments, or 
combinations of instruments, would produce different colours and patterns, and that 
the same note played at the same pitch but on a different instrument would result in a 
different colour.  Musical intervals, tonality and themes created landscapes that she 
referred to as maps, and the tempo of the music would dictate the speed at which the 
maps moved. GS commented that she often found the maps easier to follow than 
standard musical notation.  
 
2.2 Normal Cross-Modal Associations 
 
Although there is a uniqueness to the visual and/or spatial phenomenon synaesthetes 
experience on hearing music, some commonalities with cross-modal associations in 
non-synaesthetes have been identified (Ward, 2013). For example, in the general 
population the visualised size and location of pitches has been shown to be associated 
with certain auditory characteristics: higher pitches tend to be associated with an 
elevated spatial position and a smaller size, and lower pitches with a lower space and 
a larger size (Marks, 1987, 2004; Gallace & Spence, 2006; Walker et al., 2010; Ward 
et al., 2006a). Ward et al. (2006a) posits that although there are differences between 
synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes in respect of automaticity, consistency and 
specificity of colour selections, both groups do appear to employ similar pitch 
mapping with regard to pitch-lightness.  Tsiounta, Staniland, and Patera (2013) also 
found that non-synaesthetic people appeared to use comparable mental processes to 
make associations between colours and music, and to make similar pairings at a 
conceptual level. The study examined the correlations that people from different 
cultures and backgrounds made between colour and music. Twenty different music 
genres were presented to participants and then twenty different themes from movies 
and television soundtracks. In each case participants were required to select a colour 
from a pallet that they thought was best associated with the track they were hearing. 
The results demonstrated a level of common association in some genres between 
colour and music in non-synaesthetic people 
 
2.3 Role of Emotion   
 
Similarly, a level of common association has been demonstrated between emotion and 
music, and emotion and colour (Palmer, Schloss, Xu, & Prado-Leon, 2013; Palmer, 
Langlois, & Schloss, 2016)3DOPHU¶s studies were carried out with non-synaesthetes 
and demonstrated an association between major keys and more saturated, yellow, and 
brighter colours, and an association between minor keys and darker, bluer, less 
saturated colours. In addition, emotional ratings of the colours and the musical 
excerpts showed a correlation between the emotional state and the musical excerpts, 
and emotional state to the colours, suggesting that music to colour associations might 
be mediated by emotion in the general population.   
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Isbilen & Krumhansl (2016) carried out further studies to test this hypothesis 
including in their study musicians, non-musicians, absolute pitch possessors, and 
music-colour synaesthetes. Using the preludes from %DFK¶V:HOO7HPSHUHG&ODYLHU, 
musical excerpts were presented in each of the major and minor keys and in a diverse 
range of styles.  The study comprised three experiments. Experiment 1 required 
participants to choose from a pallet of eight colours and to match them to excerpts 
heard from 24 preludes. From the colour choices made, it was found that the preludes 
could be grouped together in terms of tempo, key, pitch height and attack rate. In 
Experiment 2, participants were asked to rate the colours on an emotional scale, and 
in Experiment 3, they were asked to rate the preludes they heard on the same 
emotional scale. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 were then combined and it was 
found that the music-colour associations observed in Experiment 1 could be predicted 
by the colour-emotion rating given in Experiment 2, and the music-emotion rating 
given in Experiment 3. The possession of synaesthesia or absolute pitch was shown to 
have very little effect on the actual colours chosen for each of the musical excerpts, 
but it might be reasonable to expect that music that elicits a strong emotional response 
may be more likely to induce synaesthesia than music that does not (Marks, 2004). 
Such results suggest that there may be similarities on a general level in the way that 
people conceptualise emotions associated with music and those associated with 
colours. The conceptual meaning of music may vary with its emotional (Cutsforth, 
1925; Marks, 2004) which in some forms of music-colour synaesthesia may also be 
represented by a corresponding change in colour.  
 
Although the studies above lend support to the hypotheses that synaesthesia may rely 
on normal cross-modal associations (Marks, 2013; Simner, 2013) and that 
chromesthesia is a general mental mechanism that helps us process aural information 
(Marks, 1975), this apparent common association should not be used to dismiss 
synaesthesia as a distinct phenomenon per se. Both synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes 
are exposed to the same learned cultural and environmental associations: large objects 
do tend to make louder noises on impact than smaller ones, and higher pitches are 
generally associated with the sounds made by smaller objects (Spence, 2011). Indeed, 
Parise and Spence (2009) posit that the connection between pitch and elevation might 
EHWKHEUDLQ¶VHPSOR\PHQWRIFRXSOLQJSULRUVWRHQDEOHLWWRLQWHUSUHWWKHQDWXUDO
environment. However, it has been pointed out that it is the automaticity, general 
consistency, and specificity of inducer and congruent pairings that set synaesthesia 
apart from normal cross-modal associations (Ward et al., 2006a).   
 
Notwithstanding the similarities to the cross-modal associations made between music 
excerpts, emotion, and colour by non-synaesthetes, studies exploring coloured hearing 
or auditory-colour synaesthesia frequently focus on those synaesthetes who report 
sensations of colour arising from the sound of pure tones (Ward et al., 2006a). From 
this stems comparisons to the hypothesised mechanisms of absolute pitch and the 
ability to assign a label to individual notes (Gregersen et al., 2013; Loui, Zamm, & 
Schlaug, 2013; Profita, Bidder, Optiz & Reynolds, 1988; Takeuchi & Hulse, 1993). 
However, music-colour synaesthesia is not simply about the ability to label an 
isolated pitch or a chord and is not always accompanied by the possession of absolute 
pitch (Mills, Boteler & Oliver, 1999). As previously discussed, music-colour 
synaesthesia is often dependent on timbre, context, and key, and accompanied by 
shapes, spatial layouts and textures (Eagleman & Goodale, 2009). Self-report is often 
the only means of discovery and although questionnaires and interviews are useful 
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means of gathering data these do not provide a method of verification of its existence 
and properties.  
 
2.4 Methods of Verification 
 
The development of the test of genuineness (TOG) for word-colour synaesthesia 
established consistency over time as the primary measure to distinguish real cases of 
synaesthesia from non-genuine cases (Baron-Cohen, Wyke, & Binnie, 1987). From 
this principle, WKH6\QDHVWKHVLD%DWWHU\µWKH%DWWHU\¶ZDVGHYHORSHGE\(DJOHPDQ, 
Kagan, Nelson, Sagaram and Sarma (2007) to provide a quantifiable battery of online 
tests for several different types of synaesthesia. The Battery comprises a questionnaire 
to identify the type of synaesthesia that might be present, which is then tested by 
appropriately designed software programs. A pallet of 16.7 million colours is offered 
from which a corresponding concurrent may be chosen. Each inducer is presented 
three times during the trial and any variation in the colours chosen is analysed for 
consistency by measuring the geometric distance in RGB (red, green, blue) colour 
space. A total colour variation score per participant is then calculated from this. Those 
who score less than 1 are verified as having synaesthesia, with controls generally 
scoring over 2 (Eagleman et al., 2007).  The Battery has been used successfully in 
verifying grapheme-colour synaesthesia (Rothen, Seth, Witzel, & Ward, 2013) and 
also offers tests for tone-colour synaesthesia, single chords to colour, and instruments 
to colour (Zamm, Schlaug, Eagleman, & Loui, 2013). However, the sheer number of 
colour choices available may make it difficult to find the exact same colour the 
second time around, and not all synaesthetes just experience a single colour. 
Synaesthetes who experience textures, shapes, and movement in addition to colour, 
may find the colour palette too limited. Music-colour synaesthetes are frequently 
reported to experience combinations of different colours, hues and shapes (Mills et 
al., 2003; Marks, 2011) and so the Battery may be less useful in identifying this form 
of synaesthesia. Indeed, the exclusive use of the Battery might result in certain types 
of music-colour synaesthesia being ruled out altogether. Synaesthesia elicited from 
music is mediated by more than just sound. Changes in timbre, pitch height, tempo, 
emotional content and style, either individually or in combination, might significantly 
affect the synaesthetic texture, hue, saturation and movement of a musical excerpt, 
possibly making the perceived colour inconsistent across presentation (Mills et al., 
2003). Consequently, those that require the context of an entire piece of music to elicit 
colours may find that the presentation of isolated chords, tones or instrumental 
timbres simply insufficient to bring about a synaesthetic response. 
 
The requirement of consistency as the primary measure in the TOG for the existence 
of synaesthesia has been placed under scrutiny by both Simner (2012) and Cohen 
Kadosh and Terhune (2012).  Simner points out that with the existence of so many 
different types of synaesthesia it may be incorrect to assume that each type operates 
through the same mechanism. The danger of the reliance on measures that solely use 
the consistency test for verification might result in some forms of synaesthesia being 
overlooked, such as the types of music-colour synaesthesia mentioned earlier that 
require more than an isolated tone to elicit a synaesthetic response. Furthermore, it 
has been demonstrated that in reality there can be some inconsistency in synaesthesia 
and that some variation over time has been observed, particularly in children 
(Cytowic, 2002; Eagleman et al., 2007; Rogers, 1987). The subject of Mills¶ case 
study, GS, reported inconsistencies in her experiences: µSometimes the same note 
  5 
ZRXOGEHSOD\HGEXWZLOOEHDGLIIHUHQWFRORU,GRQ¶WNQRZZK\HYHQRQWKHVDPH
LQVWUXPHQWLW¶ll be a different color¶ (Mills et al., 2003, p.1364). Ward and Mattingley 
(2006b) also question the prescriptive nature of the consistency requirement in the 
72*DVNLQJµWould we not consider a person to be a synaesthete if the colours he or 
she experienced for particular mXVLFDOQRWHVFKDQJHGRYHUWLPH"¶ and suggests that it 
VKRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDVDQµDVVRFLDWHGFKDUDFWHULVWLF¶UDWKHUWKDQDVDQDOOGHILQLQJRQH
(p. 130).  Simner (2012) presents the challenge of finding a better measure than 
consistency. Cohen Kadosh and Terhune (2012) agree and remark that failure of a 
consistency test should not result in the exclusion of those that none the less report 
synaesthetic experiences equally well demonstrated through behavioural tests such as 
Stroop interference (Stroop, 1935). For example, a synaesthete who seHVDµ¶DVJUHHQ
DQGDµ¶DVUHGPD\ILQGLWPRUHGLIILFXOWWRLGHQWLI\Dµ¶LQUHGLQNRUDµ¶LQJUHHQ
ink, should this be incongruous with their synaesthetic colour (Mills et al., 1999; 
Dixon, Smilek, Cudahy, & Merikle, 2000; Mattingley, Rich, Yelland & Bradhaw, 
2001). Yet, it should be noted, as demonstrated by Elias, Saucier, Hardie and Sarty 
(2003), that Stroop interference alone is not sufficient to confirm the existence of 
synaesthesia, as it may demonstrate the presence of learned associations.  In this study 
one control had been using cross stitch patterns for eight years during which time 
learned associations had formed between certain colours and numbers. Significant 
Stroop interference was noted for both the grapheme-colour synaesthete and the 
control, but it was not possible to categorically distinguish between the two.  
However, although the consistency test might be best used in association with other 
measures rather than alone, it does show us that a difference exists between 
synaesthetes and non synaesthetes (Hubbard, Arman, Ramachandran & Boynton, 
2005) and suggests that the experience is vivid and specific enough to be able to 
select very precisely. 
 
 
2.5 Individual Differences between Synaesthetes 
 
A further complication in finding a suitable method of verification for synaesthesia is 
a noted difference in phenomenological experience between categories of 
synaesthetes themselves: µDVVRFLDWRUV¶DQGµSURMHFWRUV¶DQGµKLJKHU¶DQGµORZHU¶
V\QDHVWKHWHV$VVRFLDWRUVRIWHQGHVFULEHWKHLUH[SHULHQFHRIFRORXUDVEHLQJLQµWKH
PLQG¶VH\H¶(Dixon, Smilek & Merikle, 2004; Dixon & Smilek, 2005) RUDVµNQRZLQJ¶
the colour (Ward, Li, Salih & Sagiv, 2007) suggesting the application of higher 
cognitive processes (Meier & Rothen, 2007). In contrast projectors describe being 
DEOHWRµVHH¶FRORXUVZKLFKDUHRIWHQSURMHFWHGRXWVLGHWKHERG\DQGLQWRH[WHUQDO
space (Smilek, Dixon, Cudahy, & Merikle, 2001). A behavioural study carried out by 
Dixon et al., (2004) demonstrated that the distinction is not just confined to the self-
reporting phenomenal experience but that it also points to different cognitive 
mechanisms. The study carried out a Stroop test on grapheme-colour synaesthetes and 
demonstrated that projectors were slower in naming the actual colour of digits when 
the colour was incongruent with their synaesthetic colours, whilst the reverse pattern 
was demonstrated by associators. Overall, different patterns of Stroop interference 
were shown by projectors and associators. Van Leeuwen, den Ouden and Hagoort 
(2011) also demonstrated differences in processing between associators and projectors 
using dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of fMRI data.  Evidence was shown that 
associators demonstrated disinhibited feedback from the parietal cortex to the V4 
colour area, whilst projectors favoured cross-activation from an area that processed 
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letter shape, or form, directly to the V4 area. Compared to the literature on associators 
and projectors, there is less empirical evidence for the categorisation of higher and 
lower synaesthetes (Chiou & Rich, 2014). The distinction between higher and lower 
synaesthetes was first proposed by Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001b) in the face of 
contradictory results, who posited that cross-activation mechanisms were occurring at 
a different time and place in the brain in each case. Lower synaesthetes were thought 
to be processing at an earlier stage in the fusiform areas that manage grapheme form 
and the perception of colour, whilst higher synaesthetes were thought to process at a 
later stage in the areas that dealt with conceptual aspects of colour. The distinction 
between higher and lower synaesthetes lies in the type of inducer and the level of 
processing. Synaesthesia in a lower synaesthete is thought to be triggered by bottom-
up lower level features such as the shape or texture of an inducer, whilst in higher 
synaesthetes the conceptual characteristics of the inducer influence higher level later 
stage processing (van Leeuwen, 2013). The early stage in processing in lower 
V\QDHVWKHWHVFDQOHDGWRHDUO\SHUFHSWXDOHIIHFWVNQRZQDVµSRSRXW¶(Ramachandran 
& Hubbard, 2001b). It was originally thought that all synaesthetes would demonstrate 
WKHDELOLW\WRGRWKLVDVLQ5DPDFKDQGUDQDQG+XEEDUG¶VDH[SHULPHQWDVNLQJ
SDUWLFLSDQWVWRILQGDKLGGHQVKDSHRIµ¶s LQDSDWWHUQRIµ¶V+RZHYHUDODWHUVWXG\
found that this was not the case. Lower synaesthetes might be able to identify a target 
amongst distractors very fast, but in higher synaesthetes this ability is not as strong 
(Hubbard et al., 2005). This is because it is not the shape of the digit that induces the 
concurrent for higher synaesthetes, but the concept or meaning of the letter (Cytowic 
& Eagleman, 2009). Although on the face of it, it may be reasonable to suppose that 
associators should be mapped to higher synaesthetes and projectors to lower 
synaesthetes, this has not been substantiated and in some studies proved to be 
orthogonal (Ward et al., 2007). The distinction between associators and projectors is 
in the experience of the concurrent, whilst that between higher and lower synaesthetes 
is the nature of the inducer. Consequently, in principle, it is not impossible to have a 
ORZHUV\QDHVWKHWHWKDWSHUFHLYHVFRORXUVLQKLVµPLQG¶VH\H¶RUDKLJKHUV\QDHVWKHWH
that is a projector. Although much of the literature has focused on grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia (Dixon et al., 2004; Rouw & Scholte, 2007; Ward et al., 2007), the 
distinction between higher and lower synaesthetes has significant implications for 
music-colour synaesthesia. Experiences resulting from different musical styles, 
composers, harmonic progressions, association with keys, written notation (Ward, 
Tsakanikos & Bray, 2006c) or emotion (Isbilen & Krumhansl, 2016; Ward, 2004) 
present a variety of types of inducer. The correct categorisation of synaesthetes as 
associators, projectors, and or lower or higher synaesthetes is pertinent to the true 
interpretation of experimental results. Only with consideration of the individual 
differences between synaesthetes can an understanding of the mechanisms at work in 
music-colour synaesthesia be achieved. If all the synaesthetes in a study are classed as 
higher synaesthetes, then results cannot be expected to support a hypothesis based on 
synaesthetic responses from early stage processing. 
3 NEUROLOGICAL THEORIES  
 
3.1 Disinhibited Feedback Theory and Hyperconnectivity Theory  
 
Much of the literature in the last twenty years has focused on establishing the 
existence of synaesthesia as a true phenomenon and explaining its cause. Currently, 
WKHJHQHUDODJUHHPHQWLVµthat synaesthesia is neither imagination nor is it 
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metaphorical thinkingLQVWHDGLWKDVDQHXUDOEDVLV¶ (Rothen, Meier, & Ward, 2012, p. 
1953). The two primary neurological theories for the causes of synaesthesia are the 
disinhibited feedback hypothesis (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) and the 
hyperconnectivity theory, or the revised hyperbinding theory (Ramachandran & 
Hubbard, 2001a; Hubbard, Brang, & Ramachandran, 2011). The disinhibited 
feedback theory has been developed from behavioural studies and suggests that 
synaesthesia may come about through a diminution of inhibition travelling through 
feedback pathways. Information travels in either direction between primary sensory 
areas to association areas such as the parietal lobe or limbic system.  It could be 
possible that later stages of processing might influence earlier stages of processing if 
feedback signals were not sufficiently inhibited (Neufeld et al., 2012b).  
In contrast, the hyperconnectivity theory suggests that direct connections exist 
between the areas of the brain that process the inducer stimulus and those that process 
the concurrent experience. No higher-level processing is involved and the process is 
purely bottom-up without the parietal cortex playing a major role (van Leeuwen, 
Singer & 1LNROLü, 2015). However, it should be noted that the more recent 
hyperbinding model revises the hyperconnectivity theory by adding a role for the 
parietal cortex in binding together colour and grapheme (Hubbard, et al., 2011). 
Analysis of the timing of neural activations may indicate whether synaesthetic 
experiences are mainly governed by top-down (late conceptual) or bottom-up (early 
perceptual) processes (Jäncke, 2013).  
 
Although not addressed by Grossenbacher and Lovelace (2001), Brang, Hubbard, 
Coulson, Huang and Ramachandran (2010) identify that because of later top-down 
processing in disinhibited feedback, there should be an observable time lag between 
the processing of the inducer and the concurrent. In a case of the 
hyperconnectivity/hyperbinding theory, the direct connections between the inducing 
and concurrent areas of the brain should occur without delay, as processing in both 
areas should occur almost simultaneously. Yet neither theory has been categorically 
proven to be better than the other, or that they cannot exist side by side (Cytowic & 
Eagleman, 2009). Although some support for the neurological basis of synaesthesia 
has been observed in the activation of the V4 colour area in grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia (Nunn et al., 2002), a limitation of most neuroimaging studies is that 
they focus on grapheme-colour synaesthesia alone. Nunn et al. (2002) considered the 
activation of the V4 area as proof for the existence of synaesthesia and the presence of 
hyperconnectivity, but it cannot necessarily be assumed that it is directly translatable 
to other forms (Zamm et al., 2013). For example, Neufeld et al.¶V(2012a) study found 
that there was no activation in the V4 areas for music-colour synaesthetes. The next 
section compares the results of eight neuroimaging studies (Table 1) conducted on 
synaesthetes with forms of coloured-hearing to examine the evidence for the presence 
of disinhibited feedback or hyperconnectivity. The studies comprise three functional 
studies (Goller, Otten, & Ward, 2009; Jäncke, Rogenmoser, Meyer, & Elmer, 2012; 
Neufeld et al., 2012a) and five structural studies (Banissy et al., 2012; Hänggi, Beeli, 
Oechslin, & Jäncke, 2008; Zamm et al., 2013; Jäncke & Langer, 2011; Neufeld et al., 
2012b).  
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3.2 Neurological Studies 
 
3.2.1 Functional  
 
Goller et al. (2009) carried out a study of 10 coloured hearing synaesthetes and 10 
controls to see if there was a stronger activation in the visual cortex for synaesthetes 
compared to controls. Of the synaesthetes, five were identified as projectors: two 
seeing colours in front of them and three from where the sound originated. Of the 
remainder, three ZHUHFODVVHGDVDVVRFLDWRUVVHHLQJFRORXUVLQWKHPLQG¶VH\HDQG
two were a combination of associator and projector. An Electroencephalograph (EEG) 
study was carried out during which all participants heard five pure tones. The purpose 
of the study was to investigate whether early differences in auditory event-related 
potentials (ERPs) existed in the synaesthetes, which might indicate that sound 
processing differences in coloured hearing synaesthesia involves the auditory cortex 
and superior temporal regions. Although there were differences in auditory ERPs in 
the synaesthetes suggesting the involvement of auditory cortex and superior temporal 
regions, the results did not support a visual potential. The authors consider the results 
to be complementary to the disinhibited feedback theory, rather than to a suggestion 
of special direct connections between visual and auditory pathways in the brain.  It 
should also be noted that a difference was found between two particular synaesthetes: 
SL, who was identified as an associator, and, JL, a projector.  The authors suggest that 
earlier processing in projectors (Dixon et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2007) might be an 
explanation for -/¶VJUHDWHUVL]HRIYLVXDO3DQHDUO\YLVXDOUHODWHG(53FRPSRQHQW
of 80-120 msec, compared to SL¶VQHJDWLYHODWHUGHIOHFWLRQRI-270 msec.  Later 
Jäncke et al. (2012) tested 11 coloured hearing synaesthetes and 11 controls with a 
more intricate test, again to see if there was an involvement of the visual area in the 
synaesthetes. EEG signals were measured whilst participants watched a silent movie 
and attempted to ignore presented tones: 440Hz 60% of the time, and 4 deviants 
(438Hz, 422Hz, 416Hz and 264Hz) each presented 10% of the time. Mismatch 
negativity (MMN) was observed for both groups but the MMNs were larger in 
synaesthetes for the two largest deviant tones (416Hz and 264Hz) suggesting that the 
larger deviance was due to the synaesthetic colour being processed early and pre-
attentively. A LORETA source reconstruction suggested the possible involvement of 
visual areas in this group.  However, Hupé and Dojat (2015) comment that a 
limitation with this study is the absence of MMN readings for tones that did not 
produce a synaesthetic response. It cannot be certain whether this group, particularly, 
just had a better MMN for stronger deviants irrespective of the presence of their 
synaesthesia.  
 
No further clarity was produced from Neufeld et al.¶V(2012a) fMRI study that 
compared the blood oxygenation level deviation (BOLD) responses in 14 tone-colour 
synaesthetes and 14 controls to different sounds played by different instruments.  The 
authors found that the only difference was a stronger activation in the synaesthetes in 
the left inferior parietal cortex and no difference was found in the ROI (regions of 
interest) analysis at the V4 colour area nor any other visual area.  The increased 
activity observed in the parietal cortex of the synaesthetes lends support to the 
K\SRWKHVLVRILWVUROHLQµK\SHUELQGLQJ¶LQV\QDHVWKHVLD(Hubbard et al., 2011) as a 
sensory hub between auditory (inducer) and visual (concurrent) information. The 
results do not support direct connections between auditory or visual areas in the brain 
as predicted by the hyperconnectivity theory.  
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3.2.2 Structural 
 
Hänggi et al. (2008) carried out a single case study on a professional flute player, ES, 
who had tone-colour, interval-taste synaesthesia and absolute pitch, compared to 17 
musicians and 20 controls. Both groups were tested for diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI) and T1 weighted differences in both fractional anisotropy (FA) and white 
matter (WM) in the auditory area of ES.  $VLQ*ROOHUHWDO¶V(2009) study, Hänggi 
found differences in the auditory areas. Banissy et al. (2012) examined 9 synaesthetes 
and 42 controls. The synaesthetes all reported grapheme-colour synaesthesia and 8 
also had tone-colour synaesthesia. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) was used to 
observe whether there was an increased volume of grey matter (GM) in the 
synaesthetes compared to controls. ROI analysis revealed a larger GM in the left 
posterior and less GM in the left anterior part of the fusiform gyrus of the synaesthete 
group. However, no difference between the two groups was observed on whole brain 
analysis. Furthermore, how much the overall results may have been influenced by the 
presence of grapheme-colour synaesthesia as well as tone-colour is not clear.  It is 
noted by Zamm et al. (2013) that whilst certain functional MRI, EEG and MEG 
studies have found activation in the V4 area in synaesthetes (van Leeuwen, Petersson, 
& Hagoort, 2010; Weiss, Zilles, & Fink, 2005; Brang, Edwards, Ramachandran, & 
Coulson, 2008; Sagiv & Ward, 2006; Beeli, Esslen, & Jäncke, 2008), most of these 
studies have concentrated on grapheme-colour synaesthesia. Because the areas of 
inducer and concurrent in grapheme synaesthesia may be adjacent to one another, 
Zamm et al. (2013) remark that the results may not be translatable to other forms of 
synaesthesia. Encouraged by the studies of Goller et al. (2009), Jäncke et al. (2012) 
and Hänggi et al. (2008), Zamm tested the hypothesis that there might be increased 
connectivity in WM pathways passing through the temporal and occipital regions in 
music-colour synaesthesia. In a study that compared 10 controls to 10 synaesthetes 
with tone-colour, chord-colour and instrument-colour (as defined by the subsets in the 
Eagleman Battery, 2007), Zamm used DTI to trace WM tracts in these areas and 
found that WM integrity within the right inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus (IFOF) 
was significantly greater in synaesthetes than controls. Zamm considers these results 
to suggest a likelihood of an increased connectivity in visual and auditory areas in 
music-colour synaesthesia. In contrast, instead of using structural or functional 
measures, Jäncke & Langer (2011) focused on resting state electroencephalography 
(EEG) to test the role and connectivity between the parietal cortex, auditory cortex 
and fusiform gyrus in coloured-hearing synaesthesia. 12 coloured-hearing 
synaesthetes and 13 non-synaesthetes were tested. The results showed that there was 
no increased connectivity in the fusiform gyrus and that there was no difference in 
general connectivity between the two groups. Although still lacking in direct 
evidence, higher values for synaesthetes in the parietal cortex led to the suggestion 
that more highly interconnected hubs might exist in the parietal regions in coloured-
hearing synaesthesia thereby lending support to the hyperbinding theory (Hubbard et 
al., 2011).  Finally, Neufeld et al. (2012b) performed a functional connectivity 
analysis on fMRI data collected from 14 tone-colour synaesthetes and 14 controls. 
The study found no increased connectivity in synaesthetes between the visual and the 
auditory cortex, but they did detect increased connectivity between the right auditory 
cortex and the left and right motor cortex, as well as between the left inferior parietal 
cortex and both the left primary auditory cortex and the right primary visual cortex. 
The authors consider these findings to be further support for the disinhibited feedback 
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theory. A point of note is that all 14 of the synaesthetes were classed as associators, 
which van Leeuwen (2013) suggests might strengthen the theory that associators tend 
to rely more on top-down processing.  
 
 
3.2.3 Summary of Neurological Studies 
 
In summary, the results of the eight studies were largely inconclusive. Only Goller et 
al. (2009) and Neufeld et al. (2012b) considered that their results supported the 
operation of disinhibited feedback, whilst Neufeld et al. (2012a), and Jäncke and 
Langer (2011), favoured hyperbinding. Zamm et al. (2013) identified structural 
differences in increased white matter tracts between visual and auditory areas in 
synaesthetes that could suggest hyperconnectivity, which was also largely supported 
by Hänggi et al. (2008) Banissy et al. (2012) and Jäncke HWDO¶V(2012) studies. 
However, there are some limitations. It cannot be certain how Banissy et al.¶V (2012) 
results might have been influenced by grapheme-colour synaesthesia, as all but one of 
the synaesthete group possessed both grapheme and tone-colour synaesthesias. 
Hänggi et al.¶V(2008) subject, ES, also possessed absolute pitch. Consequently, it is 
not possible to be sure that the differences found were because of synaesthesia alone, 
as the comparisons made with musicians with absolute pitch were not conclusive 
(Hupé & Dojat, 2015). Furthermore, it should be noted that although both Banissy et 
al. (2012) and Zamm et al. (2013) found structural differences in synaesthetes, it is 
difficult to categorically say whether there are differences in the brain anatomy of 
synaesthetes, per se, or if the differences have developed because of years of 
synaesthetic activity (van Leeuwen et al., 2015). Lastly, as acknowledged by Jäncke 
et al. (2012) the small size of the synaesthete group in this study meant that it was not 
possible to distinguish between individual differences in synaesthetes, particularly 
with regard to whether synaesthetes might be associators or projectors. The detection 
of difference in the very early stages of processing may have been effected by a large 
proportion of lower synaesthetes in the group. One important finding is the 
identification of the role of the parietal cortex (Neufeld et al., 2012a, 2012b and 
Jäncke and Langer, 2011) as a potential hub in both the disinhibited feedback and 
hyperconnectivity/hyperbinding theories.   
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Participants 
 
Synaesthesia Type 
 
Modality 
 
Results 
 
Functional  
 
     
 
Goller  2009 10 synaesthetes 
10 controls 
Coloured-hearing 
5 projectors 
3 associators 
2 mixed 
 
EEG  Differences in auditory ERPs but no 
visual potential.  
 
Jäncke 2012 11 synaesthetes 
11 controls 
Coloured-hearing EEG MMNs larger for two largest deviant 
tones suggesting early pre-attentive 
processing.  
 
Neufeld 2012a 14 synaesthetes 
14 controls 
Tone-colour 
14 associators 
fMRI  BOLD differences in left inferior parietal 
cortex only. None at V4 or other visual 
regions. 
 
Structural 
 
    
Hänggi 2008 1 synaesthete 
17 musicians 
20 controls 
Tone-colour 
Interval-taste 
Absolute pitch 
DTI DTI and T1 weighted difference in FA 
and WM in auditory areas.  
 
 
Jäncke 2011 12 synaesthetes 
13 controls 
Coloured-hearing EEG   No increased connectivity in fusiform 
gyrus, and no general difference in 
connectivity.  
 
Banissy 2012 9 synaesthetes 
42 controls 
Tone-colour and  
Grapheme-colour 
VBM ± GM GM larger in left posterior and less in 
left anterior of fusiform gyrus. No 
difference in whole brain analysis. 
 
Neufeld 2012b 14 synaesthetes 
14 controls 
Tone-colour 
14 associators 
fMRI No increased connectivity between 
visual and auditory cortex. Connectivity 
between right auditory cortex and left 
and right motor cortex, and left inferior 
parietal cortex and both left primary 
auditory cortex and right primary visual 
cortex.  
 
Zamm 2013 10 synaesthetes 
10 controls 
Tone-colour and  
Music-colour 
DTI  WM greater in right IFOF  
 
 
 
Table 1 | Summary of the results of eight coloured-hearing neuroimaging studies 
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4 CONCEPT, MEANING AND QUALIA 
 
4.1 The Role of Concept and Meaning in Music-Colour Synaesthesia 
 
Although research over the last twenty years has predominantly concentrated on 
attempting to explain the cause of synaesthesia in perceptual terms, there is evidence 
to show that in some forms of synaesthesia a concept alone may be enough to induce 
the condition (van Leeuwen et al., 2015). Of the dominant theories positing a 
neurophysiological basis of synaesthesia, the disinhibited feedback theory offers the 
more compatible mechanism for the role of conceptual-level information promoting 
top down processing, but direct evidence is lacking. Several behavioural studies have 
suggested that synaesthesia is influenced by the conceptual representation of the 
inducer rather than its low-level characteristics (Chiou & Rich, 2014).  It has been 
shown that the same physical shape can be interpreted as a µ5¶ or an µS¶ depending on 
context and will result in a different concurrent experience in each case (Dixon, 
Smilek, Duffy, Zanna, & Merikle, 2006; Myles, Dixon, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003). 
Also, Dixon et al. (2000) demonstrated with grapheme-colour synaesthesia how a 
synaesthetic experience can be triggered without a sensory stimulus. Synaesthetes 
were presented with written numerical additions, such as 5 + 2, followed by a colour 
patch. The coloXUSDWFKZDVHLWKHUFRQJUXHQWRULQFRQJUXHQWZLWKWKHV\QDHVWKHWH¶V
colour for the correct answer.  Results showed that reaction times were faster when 
WKHFRORXUZDVFRQJUXHQWZLWKWKHV\QDHVWKHWH¶VFRORXUIRUWKHFRUUHFWQXPEHU
demonstrating that synaesthesia could be activated conceptually and that the physical 
presence of the inducer was not necessary: the semantic knowledge of the system was 
sufficient (Meier, 2014). Synaesthesia associated with days of the week or months, 
one of the most commonly studied forms of synaesthesia, has also been shown to be 
conceptual in nature (Simner, 2009). Colours and spatial layouts are associated with 
the position of the day in the sequence of a week, or its meaning, rather than because 
RIWKHOHWWHUWKHQDPHRIWKHGD\EHJLQVZLWK,QGHHGWKHV\QDHVWKHWH6PLODFN¶V
photograph entitled, Weekends are taller than Weekdays illustrates Saturdays and 
6XQGD\VDVEHLQJWDOOHUWKDQRWKHUGD\VRIWKHZHHN7KHPHDQLQJRIµWKHZHHNHQG¶LV
represented in the way both days occupy a graphically larger, or elevated, position in 
space (Smilack, 2012).  
 
 
4.2 Ideaesthesia 
 
These findings have led to an alternaWLYHWKHRU\RIµiGHDHVWKHVLD¶ (1LNROLü, 2009; 
Mroczko-:ąVRZLF]	1LNROLüDQGDUHSODFHPHQWGHILQLWLRQµ6\QDHVWKHVLDLVD
phenomenon in which a mental activation of a certain concept or idea is associated 
consistently with a certain perception-OLNHH[SHULHQFH¶(1LNROLü, 2009, p. 28).   
Ideasthesia has its foundation in WKHWKHRU\RIµSUDFWRSRLHLV¶WKDWVWDWHVthat concepts 
are applied and learned as nerve cells quickly adapt to external stimuli  
(1LNROLü, 2015). Although at first glance ideaesthesia would appear to be similar to 
the earlier described associative synaesthesia, what sets it apart is the way semantic 
associations may be translated from a physical synaesthesia-inducing stimulus (van 
Leeuwen et al., 2015). The assigned meaning to the stimulus then serves to mediate 
the perception-like concurrent synaesthetic experience.  In theory, ideasthesia would 
not preclude perceptual stimuli from inducing conceptually mediated concurrents 
(Mroczko-:ąVRZLF]	1LNROLü; van Leeuwen et al., 2015). The speed at which 
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some synaesthetic associations are able to be made also support ideasthesia. In a study 
conducted by Mroczko-:ąVRZLF], Metzinger, Singer and 1LNROLü (2009) grapheme 
colour syaesthetes were able to transfer their synaesthetic colours to an alphabet of 
Glagolitic graphemes (an ancient Slavic writing system) within as short a time as ten 
minutes. This would be far too fast for new low level connections between brain areas 
to form as suggested by the hyperconnectivity theory of Ramachandran & Hubbard 
(2001a, 2001b).  The authors explain the speed of the transfer by the activition of 
mental processes that recognise the meaning of the letter, rather than its form or 
shape, in so far as a grapheme in either the Latin alphabet, or in its Glagolitic 
equivalent, might represent the abstract concept of WKHOHWWHUµ$¶. (Mroczko-:ąVRZLF] 
et al. 2009) 
 
 
1LNROLü-UJHQV5RWKHQ0HLHUDQGMroczko-:ąVRZLF] (2011) also demonstrate the 
importance of purely semantic representations in synaesthesia in a study examining 
different swimming styles. Two known grapheme colour synaesthetes who were also 
semi-professional swimmers were found to associate four swimming strokes 
(breaststroke, crawl, butterfly and backstroke) with distinct synaesthetic colours. In a 
laboratory situation using a Stroop-like task, it was shown that it was not necessary 
for participants to be swimming in a pool to induce the corresponding colour 
experience.  Both synaesthetes only had to think about practising the different strokes, 
or to think about the concept of each swimming style to induce synaesthesia. Each 
synaesthete reported that they had always had this experience with swimming styles 
and that the colours had remained consistent throughout their lives.  
 
 
The role that semantic knowledge may play in some forms of music-colour 
synaesthesia is similarly suggested in an unpublished case study by De Thornley 
Head (1985) in which a tone-colour synaesthete, MH, without absolute pitch, self-
triggered tones on a synthesiser and noted down each colour response. The 
synthesiser was then transposed, without 0+¶VNQRZOHGJHDQGWKHWDVNZDVUH-
performed. There was no change in the responses. The colours noted down were in 
reaction to the tones the synaesthete thought they were hearing rather than to the 
actual pitches. Ward et al. (2006c) also presents a first empirical study supporting 
synaesthesia for musical notation which suggests that this type of music-colour 
synaesthesia may be linked to conceptual rather than perceptual processing. Case 
studies were carried out on three participants who had synaesthesia for written 
musical notation, graphemes and heard music. All three had a high level of musical 
ability and could read music. None of them had absolute pitch. The synaesthetes were 
shown to be slow at playing musical notes when they were notated in colours 
incongruent to their synaesthetic colour, and Stroop interference was observed when 
they were required to name the synaesthetic colour of the written musical note and 
ignore the veridical colour.  This type of synaesthesia was not affected by the shape of 
the musical note in the way that the shape of a letter or number has been shown to 
affect grapheme-colour synaesthesia (Ward et al., 2006c)   The results of the study 
suggest that the synaesthetic experience in this case was elicited at a conceptual level: 
at the time the pitch of the note is required to be processed.  As the name suggests 
µLGHDHVWKHVLD¶PD\PHDQWKDWsynaesthetes are not pre-disposed to synaesthesia as 
previously thought, but may learn to assign meanings to certain stimuli to strengthen 
their knowledge and understanding of abstract concepts (van Leeuwen et al., 2015). 
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Stemming from this, Jürgens and 1LNROLü (2012) posit that certain types of 
synaesthesia may simply be a useful method a child may develop to more easily 
process its first encounter of abstract concepts, such as music unfolding over time.  
Such studies should not be taken to dismiss the existence of purely perceptual forms 
of synaesthesia. However, extending research to music affords the opportunity to 
study the causes of different types of synaesthesia in a form other than the more 
frequently examined grapheme-colour (1LNROLü, 2009). 
 
 
4.3 Music-Colour Synaesthesia and Musical Qualia 
 
In a later study, 1LNROLü (2016) continues to explore ideaesthesia developing an 
µLGHDHVWKHVLDEDODQFHWKHRU\¶ZLWKDYLHZWRIRUPXODWLQJDµWKHRU\RIDUW¶. 1LNROLü 
states that at the heart of the theory lies a relationship between concept (or meaning) 
and sensation (or experience) as the two forces of ideaesthesia. Although the 
relationship between ideaesthesia and art is beyond the scope of this review, 1LNROLü 
identifies sensation and its relationship to phenomenal experiences in terms of our 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWLVNQRZQDVµTXDOLD¶ Qualia is the term used to describe the 
qualities of subjective experience associated with certain sensory stimuli (e.g., 
Jackson, 1982) such as the difference between seeing a red rose and yellow rose or, in 
musical terms, the difference between a melody played on a piano and the same 
melody played on a French horn. Music offers a rich variety of experience and such 
properties form, often ineffable, differences between RQHSHUVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFHDQGthat 
of DQRWKHU¶V.  
 
Synaesthesia has been described by Wager (1999) as an µH[WUDTXDOLD¶ that manifests 
itself differently from synaesthete to synaesthete. So, what do the different types of 
µFRQFXUUHQWTXDOLD¶(van Leeuwen et al., 2015) synaesthetes experience on hearing 
music illustrate about individual consciousness? Eagleman (2015) posits that 
synaesthesia is µ« a reminder that from person to person ± and from brain to brain ± 
RXULQWHUQDOH[SHULHQFHRIUHDOLW\FDQEHVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQW¶(p. 59). Indeed, there are 
different kinds of synaesthesia in music, and together with the different categories of 
synaesthete, the assumption that there is a unity between all types of synaesthesias 
and that each operates by means of similar mechanisms is questionable.  Auvray and 
Deroy (2015) argue that it might be better to regard each form as a separate condition 
and that defining synaesthesia remains an area for further research. Indeed, 
synaesthetic experiences may best be described as suggested by Auvray and Deroy 
µ«as richer unified experiences where additional sensory info (or qualia) get hosted 
LQWKHFRQWHQWRISHUFHSWLRQ¶ (p. 12). Yet the phenomenal experience of music-colour 
synaesthesia, indeed of synaesthesia as a whole, presents a challenge to established 
philosophical theories, three of which are discussed in the next part of this review: 
functionalism, physicalism and representationalism. 
 
 
4.3.1 Functionalism  
 
The debate about qualia began in the 1960s and 1970s surrounding discussions about 
functionalism. TKHWKHRU\RIIXQFWLRQDOLVPVWDWHVWKDWµWKHIXQFWLRQRIDPHQWDOVWDWHLV
LWVGHILQLQJIHDWXUH¶(Kind, n.d.).  There are different types of functionalism but their 
common thread is the understanding of a mental state from the position of its 
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functional role instead of in terms of its physical set up (Block 1990; Chalmers, 
1996). For example, the function of pain is not the firing of C fibres (as a physicalist 
view might uphold, as discussed below) but the avoidance of the cause of pain itself. 
In theory, functionalism allows for creatures with quite different physical set ups, to 
experience the same mental state (Smart, 1959).  
 
However, functionalism has been the target of opposition for its limitation in 
accounting for qualia (see Shoemaker, 1984; Block, 1990; Tye, 1996; Chalmers, 
1996). Functionalism does not attempt to explain qualia per se but, as described by 
Gray and colleagues (2002), looks for an understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
behavioural responses an individual may display DVDµIXQFWLRQ¶RITXDOLWDWLYH
experience. Well known objections to functionalist theories have been presented in the 
form of the following thought experiments: 
 
i) WKHLQYHUWHGTXDOLDDUJXPHQW%ORFNZKHUHWZRV\VWHPVPD\EH
IXQFWLRQDOO\LGHQWLFDOEXWHDFKH[SHULHQFHYHU\GLIIHUHQWTXDOLD 
ii) WKHDEVHQWTXDOLDDUJXPHQW%ORFN	)RGRUZKHUHWZRV\VWHPVDUH
IXQFWLRQDOO\LGHQWLFDOEXWRQHH[SHULHQFHVQRTXDOLDDWDOO 
 
µSynesthetic experiences can be defined as richer, unified experiences, where an 
additional sensory attribute (or qualia) gets hosted in the content of perception¶
(Auvrey & Deroy, 2015 p 12). The difficulty presented to functionalism by 
synaesthesia DULVHVZKHQWKHVDPHPHQWDOVWDWHSURGXFHVJUHHQRQKHDULQJDQµ$¶EXW
also on seeing grass and trees (Auvrey & Deroy, 2015). In this case the same kind of 
PHQWDOVWDWHµVHHLQJJUHHQ¶HPDQDWHVIURPWZRVHSDUDWHVWUHDPVERWKDXGLWRU\DQG
visual, not just from vision. In music-colour synaesthesia two quite different 
functions, that of hearing and vision, produce the same experience of colour and from 
this position Gray argues that synaesthesia provides a counter example to 
functionalism (Gray, 2005)+RZHYHU*UD\¶VDUJXPHQWRQO\KROGVIRUVWURQJversions 
of functionalism that add the condition that not only should any difference in function 
correspond to a difference in experience, but for any difference in experience there 
must also be a corresponding difference in function (Macpherson, 2007).  
Macpherson (2007) DOVRQRWHVWKDW*UD\¶VSUHPLVe is based on the acceptance that the 
experience of synaesthesia is perceptual and works the same way as non-synaesthetic 
experience. For this to be true both the inducer and the concurrent would need to be 
normal experiences of sound and colour, and to be entirely independent of each other. 
However, evidence from neuroimaging studies is lacking in support of this 
assumption (van Leeuwen et al., 2010; Hupé, Bordier & Dojat 2012) and Eagleman 
and Goodale (2009) have demonstrated that coloured synaesthetic experiences are 
very different to non-synaesthetic colours, often including other elements such as 
texture and movement. Furthermore, the behavioural studies discussed earlier in this 
review support the importance of the role of conceptual rather than purely perceptual 
processing in some forms of synaesthesia. Consequently, MacpKHUVRQ¶VFKDOOHQJHWR
*UD\¶VµGXDOLVWPRGHO¶DFFRXQWRIV\QDHVWKHVLDZRXOGDSSHDUWRDOORZIXQFWLRQDOLVPWR
hold its ground.  
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4.3.2 Physicalism  
 
If it can be considered that two people might be in identical mental states in 
functionalism, so might it be that they could have physically similar brain structures 
but very different phenomenal experiences on hearing music (Kind, n.d.). Physicalism 
is the very general view that everything supervenes on the physical (Smart, 1959). In 
the philosophy of mind, this has been sometimes treated with the following 
claim: there is no difference between physical implementation and mental 
states (Gray et al., 2006; Block, 1997).  Accordingly, physicalists are inclined to 
explain synaesthesia through a direct correlation between phenomenal experience and 
brain activity (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a, 2001b). This is, however, not an 
easy task: as previously discussed, experimental results are still highly inconsistent. 
So, while some maintain that future advances in neuroscience will eventually allow us 
to explain all mental phenomena in neural terms (e.g., P. M. Churchland, 1994; P. S. 
Churchland, 1989) we currently lack epistemological and methodological tools to 
fully capture most of the properties of our mental life. And this is not the only 
problem. Some aspects of mind may be more easily explained than others. As we 
learn more and more about the brain, phenomena that might be explained in terms of 
FRPSXWDWLRQDORUQHXUDOPHFKDQLVPVWKHµHDV\SUREOHPVRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶
(Chalmers, 1995, 1996) are expected to be solved at some point in the future. The 
problem of how we account for qualia, instead, presents a far more difficult challenge. 
Although it may well be likely that a physical system is responsible for qualia, we do 
not know what kind of mechanism that might be, nor have we any idea about what 
kind of biological law is involved in transforming electrical signal in the brain into 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHµKDUGSUREOHP¶RIFRQVFLRXVQHVVWKDWZKLFK
accounts for qualia, remains.   
 
&KDOPHU¶VµKDUGSUREOHP¶also has a similarity to Levine¶V earlier identification of the 
µexplanatory gap¶ (Levine, 1983). Levine states that an explanation of such 
phenomena as the transfer of heat may be given from our scientific understanding of 
the motion of molecules. Having discovered this, no further explanation is necessary.  
However, even when endowed with considerable knowledge about how a certain 
experience is due to a neural or functional state, something is still left unexplained. 
For example, uQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWSDLQLVWKHIXQFWLRQRIWKHILULQJRIµ&¶ILbres does 
not supply us with an explanation of why pain feels the way it does (Kind, n.d.). 
 
 
4.3.3 Representationalism  
 
:DJHU¶V(1999) GHVFULSWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVPLVWKDWLWLVµWKHYLHZWKDWWKH
SKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHURIDQH[SHULHQFHVXSHUYHQHVRQLWVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOFRQWHQW¶DQG
RIIHUVVRPHFODULILFDWLRQRIWKLVVWDWHPHQWLQµWKHZD\DQH[SHULHQFHVHHPVWRLWV
VXEMHFWLV>«@WKH ZD\WKHH[SHULHQFHUHSUHVHQWVWKHZRUOGDVEHLQJ¶(Wager, 1999, p. 
263). Arguably, the strongest version of representationalism is the view that 
phenomenal character is identical to its representational content (Tye, 1998) and in 
this way, representationalism attempts to explain qualia. 
 
However, representationalism has been challenged by work on synaesthesia (Wager, 
1999; Rosenberg, 2004; Brogaard, 2016). Musical qualia might be described as the 
experiential difference between hearing a piHFHSOD\HGRQDµFHOORDQGWKHVDPHSLHFH
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played on a flute¶. However, it might also include the synaesthetic experience of 
VHHLQJJUHHQRQKHDULQJDQµ$¶7KHODWWHULVQRWimmediately explainable from a 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVW¶VVWDQGSRLQWDVWKHphenomenal experience is at odds with reality: 
experiencing a note as green does not mean the note is actually green, or that the 
SHUVRQLVH[SHULHQFLQJµJUHHQ-QHVV¶$XYUD\	'HUR\Adapting Schiavio and 
van der Schyff¶V(2016) inverted qualia example (Block, 1990) as further illustration, 
a synaesthete might hear a glissando but also experience purple, whilst a non 
synaesthete would just hear the glissando. It might be argued that both experiences 
have the same representational content (the glissando), but have shared and very 
GLIIHUHQWSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHUV)URPWKLVVWDQGSRLQW7\H¶VWKHRU\cannot account for 
such synaesthetic experiences.  Wager (1999) suggests an alternative and describes 
V\QDHVWKHVLDDVDQµH[WUDTXDOLD¶RQHLQZKLFKµWZRVWDWHVZLWKWKH same 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOFRQWHQWVKDUHVRPHEXWQRWDOORIWKHLUSKHQRPHQDOFRQWHQW¶S. 264).  
On the face of it this might seem reasonable. For example, the colours, shapes and 
textures experienced in music-colour synaesthesia contribute as much to the 
qualitative experience of music as the more common subjective qualities experienced 
by non-synaesthetes.  
 
However, a representationalist might offer a straightforward argument in response.  
The challenge to representationalism only holds if it can be argued that the additional 
synaesthetic experience does not instantiate the inducer. The representationalist might 
argue that the synaesthetic experience does in fact represent something. In the case of 
DV\QDHVWKHWHH[SHULHQFLQJµJUHHQ-QHVV¶RQKHDULQJDQµ$¶, R. Gray argues that the 
FRQFXUUHQWGRHVGLIIHUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOO\LQWKDWLWµPLVUHSUHVHQWV¶JUHHQ-ness (R. 
Gray, 2001).  Instead of saying that the green-QHVVLVDWWULEXWHGWRDQµ$¶ why not 
attribute it to the misrepresentation of green triggered by the auditory stimulus?  
 
Yet Rosenberg (2004) argues against misrepresentation using an example from 
grapheme colour synaesthesia. The fact grapheme colour synaesthetes are still able to 
recognise the veridical colour of the printed letter as well as their synaesthetic colour 
would suggest that the association of a colour with a letter is not a misrepresentation 
of surface reflectance at all, but is in fact an accurate representation of the letter. Alter 
(2006, p. 6) does not agree and asks why we should not instead conclude that the 
V\QDHVWKHWLFH[SHULHQFHERWKDFFXUDWHO\FDWHJRULVHVWKHOHWWHUDVVD\DOHWWHUµ'¶ 
whilst also inaccurately representing it as being green? Even though the inducer, be it 
DOHWWHUµ'¶RUDVRXQGLQJQRWHµ$¶GRHVQRWKDYHWKHSURSHUW\RIWKHFRQFXUUHQWLIWKH
synaesthete believes that the experience represents it as having such a property, then 
there is no real argument against representationalism.  
 
 
Brogaard (2016) identifies a lack of empirical evidence as a problem with 
synaesthesia based arguments against representationalism to date, and calls for a 
different approach. Brogaard posits that some forms of projector synaesthesia might 
be considered as examples of where the phenomenology of the visual experience does 
not flow directly from the representational content. Such a case is given DVLQµ0¶D
projector who experiences a terracotta brownish-orange volume in front of the letter 
57KHYHULGLFDOFRORXURIWKHOHWWHULVEODFNDQGLWQHYHUDSSHDUVWRµ0¶WKDWLWLV
DQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQEODFN7KHOHWWHU5LWVHOIGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRµ0¶DWDQ\WLPHDV
terracotta brownish-orange. Hence the colours projected out into the world do not 
represent the mind-independent, physical object, R.  In this case it can be argued that 
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the phenomenology of visual perception is not exhausted by its representational 
content, and that representationalism is false (p. 312). Brogaard acknowledges that a 
representationalist might still attempt to dismiss synaesthesia by explaining the nature 
of such experiences as non-perceptual. However, Brogaard rejects this position by 
arguing that some forms of projector synaesthesia are DµNLQGRISHUFHSWXDO
H[SHULHQFH¶ (p. 313) based on results relating to grapheme colour synaesthesia such as 
the Stroop effect Mills et al., 1999; Mattingley et al., 2001) visual search paradigms 
(Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a) and brain imaging (Simner, 2012).  BrogaDUG¶V
view is that from this standpoint a representationalist may not simply respond by 
arguing that projector synaesthesia is not a perceptual experience.   
 
However, there are clearly difficulties in explaining some forms of music-colour 
synaesthesia in terms of musical qualia. Perhaps as suggested by Schiavio and van der 
Schyff (2016) an alternative embodied approach to the understanding of musical 
experience WKDWGRHVQRWVHHNWRµUHGXFHH[SHULHQFHWRLQQHUPHFKDQLVPV
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOUHFRYHULHVRUQHXUDOILULQJ¶S would lead to a better 
understanding. ,QGHHG6FKLDYLRDQGYDQGHU6FK\II¶Vargument that engagement with 
music involves not just internal cognitive processes but real-time interactions between 
the individual and their environment is equally relevant to the phenomenal 
experiences presented by music-colour synaesthesia.  
5 Conclusion 
 
This review has examined the current literature concerning a form of 
coloured-hearing, or chromesthesia, associated with music. It was found that  
music-colour synaesthesia has a broad scope encompassing not only tone-colour 
synaesthesia elicited on hearing individual tones, but a complex and idiosyncratic 
mixture of phenomenological experiences often mediated by timbre, tempo, emotion 
and differing musical style.  The importance of the role of individual differences from 
synaesthete to synaesthete has also been highlighted. Without consideration being 
given to the distinction between the differing experiences of associators and 
projectors or higher and lower synaesthetes it is not possible to fully understand the 
mechanisms at work and experimental results may be misinterpreted. 
 
The traditional view that synaesthesia is fundamentally a perceptual phenomenon has 
also been challenged here. The examination of eight neuroimaging studies were found 
to be largely inconclusive in respect of confirming the perceptual nature of  
music-colour synaesthesia.  However, it should be noted that not all the studies 
distinguished between associators and projectors or higher and lower synaesthetes 
amongst their participants. Nonetheless, neither the hyperconnectivity (Grossenbacher 
& Lovelace, 2001) nor the disinhibited feedback theory (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 
2001a) currently holds as a single categorical explanation for synaesthesia. 
Furthermore, comparisons made between cross-modal correspondences in non-
synaesthetes and synaesthetes in respect of pairings made from colour, music, 
emotion, pitch-height and pitch-size suggest that non-synaesthetes employ similar 
mental processes to synaesthetes. Synaesthetes may not be pre-disposed to 
synaesthesia, per se, but may have developed a method of processing abstract 
concepts such as music uQIROGLQJRYHUWLPHDIIRUGHGWRWKHPE\WKHµH[WUDTXDOLD¶
(Wager, 1999) of their synaesthetic experience. Theories promoting the notion of 
µLGHDHVWKHVLD¶1LNROLüKDYHKLJKOLJKWHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHUROHRIFRQFHSW
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and meaning in the understanding of synaesthesia (van Leeuwen et al., 2015) and 
have pushed for the move away from the purely perceptual sensory to sensory 
explanations for its cause and towards further research into the role of concept as 
inducer.  
 
Music-colour synaesthesia demonstrates that a single mechanism is not sufficient to 
explain the phenomenological experiences that arise on hearing music, either from a 
sensory musical stimulus, or from a non-sensory musical concept. Stemming from 
this arises the need to reconsider the elevated position of consistency as the primary 
measure in synaesthesia studies. It has been shown in this review that inconsistency is 
not uncommon in music-colour synaesthesia and that the failure of a consistency test 
might result in the exclusion of a subject that may be able to reliably demonstrate 
synaesthetic experiences otherwise, such as through self-report or other behavioural 
tests.  Whilst such batteries as the Eagleman Battery (Eagleman, et al., 2007) are very 
useful in determining grapheme-colour forms of synaesthesia, there is a risk that 
certain types of music-colour synaesthesia may be unnecessarily overlooked. If 
certain forms of synaesthesia can be discounted using current measures, alternative 
methods may reveal synaesthesia to be more prevalent in the general population than 
previously believed. 
 
Finally, the difficulties in reconciling the phenomenological character of music-colour 
synaesthesia with established philosophical theories have also been discussed. The 
SUREOHPRIWKHµH[WUDTXDOLD¶:DJHUSUHVHQWHGE\PXVLF-colour synaesthesia 
remains and cannot be satisfactorily explained by the theories of physicalism, 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVPRUIXQFWLRQDOLVP,QKLVWKHVHVµ:KDWLVLWOLNHWREHDEDW"¶1DJHl 
(1974) states that because the way we perceive the world is so very different to that of 
a bat, we who are not bats cannot know what it is like to be a bat. Perhaps in the same 
way those who do not have synaesthesia just cannot know what it is like to experience 
colour on hearing music, illustrating further the difficulty in fully understanding the 
phenomenon.   
 
Music-colour synaesthesia highlights the need for future research to extend to other 
forms of synaesthesia other than the more commonly examined, grapheme colour 
synaesthesia or tone-colour synaesthesia. However, a full understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying synaesthesia may not be possible if researchers continue to 
attempt to contain the phenomenon within a distinct set of rules (Simner, 2012; Cohen 
Kadosh & Terhune, DQGGRQRWUHMHFWDµRQHIRUDOO¶H[SODQDWLRQIRULWVFDXVH
(Auvray & Deroy, 2015). Together with the recognition of the difference in 
experience between associators and projectors and higher and lower synaesthetes, and 
the similarities with cross-modal correspondences in non-synaesthetes, music-colour 
synaesthesia offers an opportunity to gain a better understanding of the processes of 
general cognition and consciousness from person to person. 
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